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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The trial court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-3-
4(1). This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3. 
The Memorandum Decision was entered by the trial court on April 28, 2006, The Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial or Amend Judgment was entered on February 10, 2006, Mel 
Ingersol's Notice of Appeal was filed on March 16, 2006, pursuant to Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
APPELLANT ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err when it concluded that there was no contract 
between the Appellant and the Appellee when both parties testified that there had been a 
contract? The standard of review for findings of fact is the clearly erroneous standard. For a 
reviewing court to find error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are 
not adequately supported by the record. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
APPELLANT ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err in finding that there was no contract when 
that issue was not in contention and was not disputed by the parties? Since the issue was not in 
contention, the parties did not prepare to present evidence on the issue. The standard of review 
for findings of fact is the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to find error, it must 
decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the 
record. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 15, 2002 the parties met and came to an agreement that was partially put in 
writing. It stated: 
Whereas A-l acknowledges a credit owing Mel Ingersoll in the amount of $14,500, 
to be paid in the following manner: A-l will furnish 30 yard (drop off) containers for 
Ingersoll for a cost of $75.00 each with A-l paying landfill cost over that. Thereby 
if trucking & landfill total $ 10,000 for a month, Ingersoll will pay $2,500 and use the 
$7,500 credit on the amount due. Billing will be at month end, with the payment 
25% of total bill to be paid by 10th of each month following. Service can continue 
after credit is used up if its agreeable with both parties. 
Appellee began its service almost immediately. The service was provided from mid-May, 2002 
through August, 2002. Invoices were sent by Appellee to Appellant weekly. The services 
stopped in August, 2002. The parties then met in October, 2002. At that meeting the parties 
discussed the amount of the services received and the amount of the credit owed. They wrote out 
numbers on a piece of paper representing such services rendered and credit owed. That paper 
showed that appellant was owed at that time the sum of $6,193.00 remaining on the credit. 
At trial, the above facts were testified to by both parties. Although there was some 
disagreement with respect to the amount of the services rendered and the credit owed, both 
parties agreed that a valid agreement had been reached on May 15, 2002. However, despite both 
parties' testimony that a contract had been formed, the trial court ruled that a contract had not 
been formed; and based its ruling on that finding. 
2 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court made an erroneous finding that a contract did not exist between the 
parties. The finding was erroneous because both parties had pled that a contract had been formed 
between the parties, and during trial, both introduced evidence that a contract had been formed 
between the parties. The trial court cannot disregard the record to make a finding, therefore the 
trial court's finding that a contract did not exist should be reversed. 
V. ARGUMENT 
a. Introduction 
The trial court erred in its finding that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties 
that created a multi- party contract because that finding is contrary both to the evidence presented 
at the trial and the judicial admissions of the parties. Such error requires that this the trial court's 
decision that a contract did not exist be reversed. 
b. The Appellee Made Judicial Admissions of the Existence of a Contract in its 
Pleadings Filed with the Trial Court 
The Appellee admitted to the existence of a contract in its pleadings filed with the trial 
court. The original cause of action brought by the Appellee shows the existence of a contract. 
The Appellee brought this cause of action on February 19, 2003, claiming that Appellant owed it 
$9,006.25. (Complaint at 1). The basis for its claim that it was owed $9,006.25 by Appellant was 
that it had entered into a contract for goods and services. (Appellee's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law [^5). At paragraph 6 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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Appellee stated: 
That part of the agreement was that Defendant would provide a certain motor 
vehicle valued at $14,500.00 to one Mark Powell, Mark Powell would deliver 
a motor vehicle and three roll-off containers valued at $14,500.00 to Plaintiff 
and Defendant would be entitled to credit for the value of the vehicle he 
provided to Powell in the amount of $14,500, from Plaintiff. The agreement 
also provided that Defendant would pay Plaintiff 25% of the value of services 
rendered to Defendant, in cash, ten days following the end of the month in 
which the services were rendered and the remaining 75% of the value of the 
services would be applied towards the $ 14,500.00 credit. 
By the Appellee's judicial admissions, it is undisputed that the parties believed there to be 
a contract. For the foregoing, a new trial should be granted to further explore the alleged 
breaches of the agreement or Defendant should be awarded a judgment less an offset amount. 
c. The Testimony and Conduct of the Appellee Show the Existence of a Contract 
In addition to the judicial admissions by the Appellee that a contract existed, during 
trial the Appellee provided undisputed evidence of a contract between the parties. A contract is 
formed when one party makes an offer to another, the other party accepts the offer, and each 
party gives something of value in return for what the party received. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-
204; IJI § 10.2; see also, Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 456 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 
1972). Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204 states that "a contract for the sale of goods may be made in 
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of such a contract." Id. 
In the present case, the existence of a contract between the parties is apparent by looking 
at the testimony and conduct of the parties. The Appellant had given a truck to the Appellee, and 
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in return, the Appellee had provided Appellant with disposal services. (R at 33-36). During trial, 
Appellee testified that the parties had bargained for, and reached an agreement. (R. at 19, 20). 
In testifying about Exhibit 2, Mr. Anderson testified on cross examination that A-l 
acknowledged a credit owing to Ingersoll in the amount of $14,500.00 "on the strength of 
IngersoU's promise to deliver a truck to Mark Powell." (R. at 31, 34). The legal theory presented 
in the Appellee's case was that the contract had failed because Mr. Ingersoll had failed to deliver 
the truck to Powell.(R. at 8, 9). 
Never did the Appellee argue that there was not a contract between the parties. After Mr. 
Ingersoll presented his case, and the indisputable evidence that the truck had been delivered to 
Powell by him, Appellee changed its tune to argue that Mr. Ingersoll had breached the contract 
by not paying the 25% cash amount called for under the contract, but even then, Appellee did not 
argue that there was no contract. (R. at 142). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because the facts will not support the trial court's conclusion that there was no contract 
formed by which A-l acknowledged a $14,500 credit to Ingersoll, the trial court's decision 
should be reversed to find in favor of Ingersoll in the amount of the unused credit, which is 
$6,193.00. 
DATED this j £ of August, 2006. 
Blake S. Atkin II 
Brennan H. Moss 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A-l DISPOSAL, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
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Counterclaim 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
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Counterclaim 
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The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
April 27, 2005. Plaintiff was present through Carl Kingston and 
Defendant was present with Blake Atkin, 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a complaint February 25, 2003. It alleged 
defendant owed, for services, the sum of $9006 plus interest. 
Defendant on March 26, 2003, filed an answer and 
counterclaim alleging in the counterclaim that Anderson does 
business as A-l and that Anderson and Ingersoll entered a 
contract in May, 2002, and that contract acknowledged Anderson 
owed a credit to Ingersoll in the sum of $14,500. The 
counterclaim alleged the performance by Anderson was poor. 
Ingersoll further alleged the parties in October, 2002, resolved 
the matter and Anderson owes Ingersoll as a credit the sum of 
$6139. 
The parties engaged in discovery and this trial date was 
scheduled. 
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A-1 Disposal is a registered dba of Four Corners 
Precision Mfg. Co, a corporation, and Anderson is an authorized 
agent of A-1 and the manager of that business. It engages in the 
business of trash pick up and disposal. 
2. Mark Powell (Powell) was a customer of A-1 and owed A-1 
money for its services. The evidence did not reveal the amount of 
that debt. Powell introduced A-1, through Anderson, to Ingersoll, 
who ran a demolition business and used and needed such trash 
pickup and disposal services. 
3. In a meeting held May 15, 2002, Ingersoll met with Powell 
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and Anderson at a fast food restaurant over lunch. That was the 
first meeting or business A-1 and Ingersoll had. A-1 and 
Ingersoll, as well as Powell, came to an agreement that was 
partially put in writing by Ingersoll. It was written on scratch 
paper. It was signed by Anderson, on behalf of A-1, and 
Ingersoll. It stated (Exhibit 2) : 
Wherein A-1 acknowledges a credit owing Mel Ingersoll in the 
amount of $14,500, to be paid in the following manner: A-1 
will furnish 30 yard (drop off) containers for Ingersoll for 
a cost of $75.00 each with A-1 paying landfill cost over 
that. Thereby if trucking & landfill total $10,000 for a 
month, Ingersoll will pay $2500 and use the $7500 credit on 
the amount due. Billing will be at month end, with the 
payment 25% of total bill to be paid by 10th of month 
following. Service can continue after credit is used- up if 
its agreeable with both parties. 
4. There were also oral agreements between these persons in 
the same meeting and the written document was not the sole 
agreement. Powell owned a truck and three containers that he 
agreed to give to A-1. Ingersoll owned a different truck that he 
agreed to give to Powell, along with title to that second truck. 
Powell did turn over the truck to A-1 and later two of the three 
containers. That truck, which was undefined by the testimony as 
to year and make and value, has not been functional and A-1 has 
been unable to use it. The third container has never been 
received by A-1. Ingersoll, no later than June, 2002, turned 
over the second truck and title to Powell as Ingersoll promised. 
That is shown by the title to that truck, Exhibit 5. The reason 
A-1 acknowledged the credit to Ingersoll, who A-1 had never met 
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nor done business with, was because Powell was giving the truck 
and three containers to A-l and Ingersoll was giving a truck to 
Powell. 
5. A-l began its service almost immediately. The parties 
disagree on the sufficiency of that service and adduced more 
evidence on the subject than was needed. The court finds that 
the service provided was pursuant to any agreement the parties 
had, but that the exact nature of the service was not resolved in 
any agreement. 
6. The service was provided from mid-May through August, 
2002. Weekly invoices were sent by A-l to Ingersoll. Ingersoll 
made no payments of any kind toward the service provided. 
7. A-l and Ingersoll talked in July and August about the 
bill and Ingersoll acknowledged he owed some money but needed to 
reconcile the invoices and come to an agreed upon figure that 
was owing. At the end of August A-l ceased the trash pick up and 
disposal. There was no testimony about exactly why that service 
ceased but the court finds the parties implicitly agreed that the 
service would stop. 
8. Eventually Anderson and Ingersoll met on October 18, 
2002, in an informal setting at a job site of Ingersoll. There 
the parties wrote out figures on paper and agreed that Ingersoll 
owed for 37 trips, plus a surcharge, for a total owing for 
services in the amount of $8307. The paper has figures but 
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no words of agreement except as set out below. Ingersoll wrote on 
that paper the sum of $14,500, subtracting the amount 
acknowledged of $8307, leaving a balance figure of $6193. To 
that figure Anderson wrote "25% $2076" plus $6193 for a total of 
$8269. Anderson wrote beside the figure $8307 "account balance 
as of 10-18-02" and signed that portion. The parties disagree on 
what that writing and those figures mean and what was discussed 
concerning those figures. Exhibit 3. 
9. Sometime in November, 2002, Anderson, Powell, Ingersoll 
and Daniel Kingston, an officer of A-l, met in Kingston's office. 
The parties discussed what was owed by whom and their versions 
differ greatly. 
10. The court finds that in the October 18 meeting Ingersoll 
acknowledged the amount he owed for service by A-l was $8307. 
There was no agreement of the parties, no meeting of the minds, 
on any other facet of that writing nor on anything else discussed 
at that meeting. They did not form a contract about any other 
fact except that Ingersoll acknowledged the value of services was 
the sum of $8307. 
11. In the November, 2002, meeting, Ingersoll indicated he 
was dealing with A-l for himself and Powell, who was also 
present. Ingersoll said he wanted to resolve both accounts with 
A-l, his and Powell''s. Ingersoll acknowledged that he owed the 
sum of $8307 and that the remaining "credit" of $6193 could be 
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applied to what Powell owed A-l, as Ingersoll would rather have 
Powell owe Ingersoll rather than A-l owe Ingersoll money. 
12. In December, 2002, A-l applied that credit of $6139 to 
Powell's account, leaving a balance due by Ingersoll $8307. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The May 15, 2002, written document is not an integrated 
contract and indeed was not even a valid contract as it did not 
fully state several essential terms to form a valid agreement. It 
is ambiguous in the extreme4 and the court can thus look outside 
the agreement to attempt to find the intent of the parties. 
Examining all the evidence the court cannot decipher what the 
intent of the parties was. 
2. The integral features were not agreed upon. A-l did not 
give a "credit" of $14,500 to a person A-l had never met or done 
business with, as Ingersoll contends, based on the consideration 
of Powell's "promise" to provide a truck. There was simply no 
meeting of the minds, and the intentions of the parties never 
really existed under this alleged agreement. Thus, there is no 
contract to enforce at all, by either party. The court cannot 
determine whether the ukey" features have been breached or not, 
and so there is no contract to enforce. The circumstances under 
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which the "agreement" was entered into require the court to 
conclude that there was no intelligible agreement that can be 
enforced by either party. 
3. The course of conduct of the parties can modify an 
agreement, had there been one, and that course of conduct was 
that A-1 would continue to provide a service and Ingersoll would 
pay for it in some fashion. This is not a multiple party 
contract where the consideration is, as Ingersoll posits, 
Powell's promise to pay by providing a truck of some unnamed 
value and Ingersoll would provide a truck of some unnamed value 
to Powell. 
4. The October 18, 2002, meeting further solidifies in the 
mind of the court that the parties never achieved a meeting of 
the minds, never agreed on the essential terms of anything. The 
parties did agree only on the value of the services to date, 
$8307. A-1 and Ingersoll did not agree whether that sum would be 
paid, whether A-1 would pay Ingersoll the remaining amount of 
credit, whether Powell would be credited with that amount, or 
whether Powell would be credited with some other amount. 
5. The November 2002 meeting likewise did not result in any 
agreement or meeting of the minds. The court concludes that 
neither party agreed with the other about essential terms such 
that a valid agreement was formed. A-1 intended Ingersoll to pay 
the value of the services and credit Powell's account. Ingersoll 
7 
intended that A-1 pay Ingersoll the amount of "'credit" because 
Powell had provided the truck to A-1 and Ingersoll had provided a 
truck to Powell. 
6. The court is not ruling that Powell breached by not 
providing a working truck. The court is not ruling whether 
Ingersoll breached in providing the other truck he provided 
timely to Ingersoll. Those issues are not governing in this 
case. What governs is the lack of an agreement. 
7. The essential terms of an agreement were never reached. 
The missing terms were how and when Ingersoll would pay and what 
was the consideration for the credit to Ingersoll. Ingersoll's 
argument is not persuasive that the consideration was Powell's 
promise to provide a truck to A-1. Those essential terms of 
payment, payment for what, what credit was to be given and to 
whom, and the consideration for that credit are not set out in an 
intelligible contract nor were they agreed to verbally. Thus, 
there is no contract to enforce. 
8. On a theory of unjust enrichment, Ingersoll benefitted by 
receiving the services of A-1. Ingersoll acknowledged and agreed 
that the value of services he received was $8307. The court 
concludes it would be inequitable to allow Ingersoll to retain 
the benefit of that service without paying for it. Plaintiff is 
entitled to judgment in that amount, plus statutory interest from 
the date of September 10, 2002, the last date of billing. 
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Ingersoll is not entitled to judgment on his counterclaim. Any 
other issues between these parties and Powell will have to be 
resolved independent of these claims. The motion to dismiss made 
by Ingersoll, taken under advisement at the end of plaintiff's 
case, is denied. 
9. No attorney fees are awarded. 
Plaintiff is to prepare an order and judgment in compliance 
with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
~^? 
DATED this day °t/<n(lC j L, 2005, 
BY ^THE' 
BftUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 030904374 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail CARL E KINGSTON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
3212 S STATE ST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84115 
Mail MICHAEL J LANGFORD 
ATTORNEY DEF 
13 6 S MAIN ST 6TH FLR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Dated this Jj$ day of fUIAA I 20 <*"> 
*^ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Paap 1 (lsqt-1 
CARL E. KINGSTON (#1826) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3212 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Phone: 486-1458 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
A-l DISPOSAL, : 
Plaintiff, : COMPLAINT 
vs. : 
Civil No. 
MEL INGERSOLL, : 
Defendant, Judge 
—oooOooo— 
Comes now the Plaintiff and for cause of action alleges: 
1. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. The amount sought herein is less than $20,000.00, exclusive of costs. 
3. Defendant owes Plaintiff the sum of $9,006.25 plus interest thereon from 
December 1, 2002 at the rate of 18% per annum, for merchandise and/or services 
provided at Defendant's request. 
4. The total amount set forth above is past due and remains unpaid, despite 
demand. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against in the sum of $9,006.25 plus 
interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from December 1, 2002, attorney's fees of 
$775.00 or such greater sum as the Court deems reasonable, for its costs and for such 
other and further relief as to the Court seems 
just. 
Dated this }? day of February, 2003. 
Carl E. Kingston 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs address: 
624 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
CARL E. KINGSTON (#1826) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3212 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Phone: 486-1458 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
A-l DISPOSAL, : 
(Proposed) 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
Civil No. 030904374 
MELINGERSOLL, : 
Defendant. Judge Collection 
—oooOooo— 
The above entitled action came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Bruce 
C. Lubeck, on April 27, 2005, at 9:00 a.m. The Plaintiff appeared through its agents and 
was represented by Carl E. Kingston, and Defendant appeared and was represented by 
Michael Langford. The Court heard testimony of the parties and witnesses called, 
reviewed the evidence submitted, heard oral arguments of counsel, and being folly 
advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of this 
lawsuit. 
2. That the Plaintiff, A-l Disposal, is a registered d/b/a of Four Comers 
Precision Manufacturing, Co., a Utah corporation. 
3. That Ralph Anderson is the Secretary of Four Corners Precision 
Manufacturing Co., and the manager of A-l Disposal. 
4. That Ralph Anderson was acting as agent for A-l Disposal at all material 
times in this case. 
5. That the parties entered into an agreement on or about May 15, 2002, whereby 
Plaintiff would provide disposal serviced to Defendant at certain prices agreed upon. 
6. That part of the agreement was that Defendant would provide a certain motor 
vehicle valued at $14,500.00 to one Mark Powell, Mark Powell would deliver a motor 
vehicle and three roll-off containers valued at $14,500.00 to Plaintiff and Defendant 
would be entitled to credit for the value of the vehicle he provided to Powell in the 
amount of $14,500.00, from Plaintiff. The agreement also provided that Defendant 
would pay Plaintiff 25% of the value of services rendered to Defendant by Plaintiff, in 
cash, ten days following the end of the month in which the services were rendered and 
the remaining 75% of the value of the services would be applied towards the $14,500.00 
credit. 
7. That during the months of May, June, July and August, 2002, Defendant 
ordered services from Plaintiff with an agreed value of $8,307.00 and Plaintiff provided 
those services to Defendant. 
8. That the May 15, 2002 agreement became void when Powell failed to provide 
three roll-off containers to Plaintiff, Defendant failed to provide Mark Powell with the 
motor vehicle Defendant agreed to deliver, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff the 25% of 
the value of the services provided when due and Defendant discontinued the use of 
Plaintiff's services. 
9. Plaintiff continued to provide service to Mark Powell and gave him credit for 
the value of the truck and two roll-off containers he provided to Plaintiff, towards the 
services provided by Plaintiff to Powell. 
10. The reasonable value of the services provided to Defendant by plaintiff was 
$8,307.00. 
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WHEREFORE, having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws 
therefrom, these, its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The May 15, 2002 agreement is void for non-performance of the parties. 
2. Plaintiff provided garbage disposal services to Defendant at the agreed upon 
value of $8,307.00. 
3. Defendant owes Plaintiff the sum of $8,307.00 for the services provided. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant in the amount of $8,307.00, 
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from September 10, 2002 and its court 
costs. 
5. Defendant's Counterclaim against Ralph Anderson should be dismissed, for no 
cause of action. 
Dated this day of April, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing (Proposed) Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to Michael J. Langford, Esq., 136 South Main Street, 6thFloor, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this ^ ~ day of April, 2005, postage prepaid. 
^ 
Carl E. Kingston 
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the 10th of that month. In other words, the services that 
were performed in May would be billed out at the end of May, 
the first of June, and 2 5 percent of the value of those 
services would be paid by the 10th of June. The remaining 
75 percent would be credited towards the value of the truck. 
Very shortly after the agreement was signed — 
well, I think even the same day — A-1 started providing 
services to Mr. Ingersoll. But the rest of the agreement 
wasn't followed through. A-1 was not able to get all of the 
containers for Mr. Powell. And they got the truck and a 
couple of containers. Mr. Powell was not able to get the 
truck for Mr. Ingersoll, or at least the title to the truck 
so that he could use it. And after billing Mr. Ingersoll, 
the 2 5 percent was not paid. So that agreement, at least in 
the eyes of the plaintiff, was void. It wasn't followed 
through; it was breached. 
A-1 continued to provided services through June, 
through July, through August, and send bills and statements 
to Mr. Ingersoll. Nothing was paid. There were meetings 
between A-1 and Mr. Powell and Mr. Ingersoll, sometimes 
together sometimes separately, where it was acknowledged 
22 there was an amount owed. In fact, they reached an 
23 
24 
agreement that the value of the services was some $8,307. 
And it was always a commitment that that would be taken care 
25 of, but never was. 
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In July, when Mr. Powell was unable to get what he 
wanted from Mr. Ingersoll, he told A-l, "Give me the credit 
because I gave you the truck." So the credit for the truck 
was given to Mr. Powell. 
A-l, despite trying to collect from Mr. Ingersoll, 
never did, and so we filed this lawsuit, and that's why 
we're here today. And I think that's what the evidence will 
show. When the trial is completed, we'll be asking for 
judgment for the value of the services that were rendered, 
plus interest for that amount. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kingston. 
Mr. Atkin? 
MR. ATKIN: Your Honor, I agree that the facts are 
simple in this case. You have a classic three-way contract 
here, multi-lateral contract that's described in Restatement 
II of Contracts, Section 71, where the consideration is 
passing between different parties. Comment E of the 
Restatement, Section 71, example No. 17, you have: A 
promises B to pay B a dollar in exchange for C's promise to 
A to give A a book. The promises are a consideration for 
one another. In this case, you replace A with A-l Disposal, 
A-l Disposal promised to pay Mr. Ingersoll, in this case it 
was $14,500, in exchange for Mr. Powell's promise to give A-
1 Disposal a truck. 
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Q. Can you relate, to the best of your recollection, 
the conversation that occurred between you and Mr. Powell 
and Mr. Ingersoll at that meeting? 
A. Mark introduced us to one another and Mel told me 
that he was in the similar businesses, Mark Powell did a lot 
of demolition. And we talked about the services. Mark told 
them how well we had done on — 
MR. ATKIN: Objection, Your Honor. The — hearsay 
is my objection. Mr. Powell — M r . Powellfs statements would 
be hearsay. 
MR. KINGSTON: I donft think so. 
THE COURT: I don't — Ifm not receiving them— I 
don't think they're offered for and I'm not receiving them 
for the truth. I think they're part of the operative legal 
pact of forming a contract. So, yeah, avoid any — as much 
as you can what Mr. Powell said about this unrelated to 
the — to the contract. But, overruled. I'll hear that. 
THE WITNESS: And we talked about the job that we 
had done for Mark Powell. And then we negotiated what the 
price would be for us to do service for Mel Ingersoll. 
Q. (By Mr. Kingston) And what precisely was the 
agreement that was reached between the three parties at that 
meeting? 
A. Mark would deliver a truck — a roll-off truck and 
three containers to us and Mel would deliver a truck to Mark 
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Powell and we would provide service. 
Q. Was the value of the truck that Mr. Powell was to 
receive from Ingersoll about the same value as the truck and 
roll-off containers that you were to receive from 
Mr. Powell? 
A. They said it was. 
Q. And what was that value; do you remember? 
A. $14,500. 
Q. Let me show you what has been marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2. Can you identify that document? 
A. Yeah. This is the agreement that Mel Ingersoll 
wrote up. 
Q. Now, the agreement says: "A-l will provide — or 
furnish 3 0-yard roll-off containers for Ingersoll for a cost 
of $75 each, with A-l paying land fill costs over that 
amount of trucking and land fill total ten thousand for a 
month. Ingersoll will pay $2,500 and use up $7,500 credit 
as the amount due." 
Can you explain exactly what you understood that 
to be? 
A. Yeah. We would bill him $75 for each load. $75 
plus the landfill fees. We was to pay the landfill and then 
he would reimburse us for that because he didn't have an 
account at the landfill. 
Q. And what about payment to A-l for that service? 
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to be a Philadelphia lawyer to try to understand those 
invoices"? Do you recall that? 
A. He had a lot of funny lines like that. 
Q. Okay. Now, going back to this Exhibit 1, in — not 
Exhibit 1, it's Exhibit 2. And, Your Honor, do you have a 
copies of these — 
THE COURT: I don't. 
MR. ATKIN: Could I approach the Court with a copy 
of those? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. ATKIN: It may make it easier to follow along. 
Q. Going back to what has been marked as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2, or has been introduced now into evidence, this 
Exhibit 2, the first line of this agreement says: "A-1 
acknowledges a credit owing Mel Ingersoll in the amount of 
$14,500." Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And that promise by A-1 to give 
Mr. Ingersoll $14,500, that was on the strength of a promise 
by Mark Powell to deliver a truck to A-1 Disposal, correct? 
A. A truck and three containers. A truck in working 
condition and three containers. 
Q. Okay. Now, let me ask you about that. In your 
deposition that we took, I asked you about that 
consideration that you were receiving; do you recall that? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And you didn't mention anything about three 
containers in giving that answer to me, did you? 
A. I may not have. 
Q. Okay. And then I asked you again: "Do you still 
have the truck?" 
And you answered, "Yes." Do you recall that? 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. And, again, you didn't mention anything about any 
three containers that you claimed you didn't receive, did 
you? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Okay. And then I asked you later: "Did you still 
have possession of the truck?" 
And you answered "Yes." But, again, didn't say 
anything about any three containers that you claim now that 
you didn't receive, right? 
A. Okay. 
Q. And then, later on, I asked you again, 
"Question: So Mel was going to deliver the truck to 
Mark, Mark was going to deliver the truck, the white 
Expeditor, to you in exchange for the $14,500 credit?" 
Your answer was "Yes." 
"Question: You in fact received the white Expeditor 
truck?" 
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Answer was "Yes." 
"Question: And you still possess it today?" 
And the answer was "Yes." 
Do you recall giving those answers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, again, no mention in any of that dialogue 
about not having received any three containers, is there? 
A. Not that you read just barely, there wasn't. 
Q. Okay. And there was no mention about truck having 
to be in working condition either, was there? 
A. Maybe not with you, but it was with Mark and Mel. 
Q. Okay. Well, when I asked you the question what 
this contract was based on and I asked you, "Did you receive 
that truck," you told me yes, and you mention any missing 
containers, correct? 
A. Not from what you read. I don't remember the 
conversation. 
Q. Okay. I'm sure if there was something that your 
counsel would bring it up. But anyway — strike that and let 
me move on. 
Okay. So we have this contract, Exhibit 2, May 
22 I15th, 2002. You acknowledge a $14,500 credit to Mel 
23 Ingersoll, and that's on the strength of this promise by Mel 
24 Ingersoll to give a truck to Mark Powell and then Mark 
25 Powell's going to give the truck to A-1 Disposal, correct? 
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A. A truck and three containers. 
Q. Well, and we — we read your testimony that you 
received that truck and that truck was still in your 
possession at the time of the deposition that I took in 
November, correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. All right. Now, you testified that in July of 
2 0 02 — this is several months after Exhibit 2 has been 
entered into — you testified that Mark Powell asked you to 
apply the $14,500 credit to his account rather than applying 
it to Mel Ingersoll's account. Do you recall that 
testimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And at that time, in July of 2 002, you 
refused to do that for Mr. Powell, didn't you? 
A. I told him that we should get together and work 
out the deal. 
Q. Okay. You understood that that was not something 
that you could unilaterally do at Mr. Powell's request 
because Mel Ingersoll was part of that agreement, correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. And you had already acknowledged to Mel Ingersoll 
that he was entitled to a $14,500 credit, right? 
A. As long as we had our truck and three containers 
and Mark Powell got his truck. 
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Q. Well, that's not in Exhibit 2, is it? Is there 
any mention in Exhibit 2 of — of the fact that Mr. Ingersoll 
was going to deliver a truck to Mr. Powell? 
A. No. That was verbal. 
Q. Okay. Mr. Powell was there at the meeting when 
Exhibit 2 was prepared, wasn't he? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, yet, who signed Exhibit 2? 
A. Myself and Mel. 
Q. And Mr. Powell didn't even sign Exhibit 2, did he? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So it's true, isn't it, Mr. Anderson, that 
the $14,500 credit that you promised to give Mr. Ingersoll 
was on the basis of the promise of Mark Powell to deliver a 
truck to you? 
A. And the basis of Mel to deliver a truck to Powell. 
Q. Well, but that's not included in the agreement, is 
it? 
A. No. That was verbal. 
Q. All right. Now, after July of 2002, after you 
claim that Mr. Powell asked you to apply that credit to his 
account rather than Mel's and you said you couldn't do that 
without talking to Mel, after that point in time, you 
continued to provide services to Mel Ingersoll, didn't you? 
A. Yes, we did. 
36 
Even if, as Mr. Atkin would represent, the breach 
of Mr. Ingersoll, if there was one, towards Mr. Powell 
wouldn't be considered a breach of the agreement between the 
other two parties. It's very clear that Mr. Ingersoll 
himself breached the agreement by not complying with the 
terms of paying the 25 percent. He complains about the 
I service and yet he used the service through May, he used the 
service through June, he used the service through July, he 
used the service through August. 
| And the testimony of Mr. Ingersoll's son is that 
there was one occasion in that period of time when he was 
I disappointed with the service when a driver came up, the 
dumpster wasn't ready to be taken yet, and he took off with 
it without taking the dumpster. That's in four months' time 
period. 
And also the agreement is very specific that in 
order for him to get that credit, he has to continue the 
service of A-l. There wasn't any agreement that he paid 
cash; that was to be paid in service. So there was clearly 
a breach of that agreement. There was a breach of the 
agreement that Mr. Powell didn't deliver what he was 
supposed to. And there was testimony, at least from what A-
1 understood, that Mr. Ingersoll hadn't delivered what he 
agreed to do. 
Now, I acknowledge that, with this exhibit of the 
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